THE SINKING
(As detailed in
"Nafragios de la Armada Espanola," by Spanish historian
Fernandez Duro in 1857)
"The frigates Anfitrite with 40 cannons and Juno
with 34, having been inspected at the port of Veracruz, left
together with treasure for the port of Cadiz (Spain) on January
15, 1802. From the moment they set sail, they encountered bad
weather which delayed their departure from Mexico and forced the
two ships to dismast and take refuge in Puerto Rico for repairs.
They set sail again on October 1, having taken on the Third
Battalion of the African regiment. The ships reached the meridian
of Bermuda and it seemed as though their luck had changed. The
weather was settled and they were able to sail together without
difficulty. Once reaching Bermuda however, the wind became
strong, the sea heavy, the skies threatened and the squalls
continuous. This was most common in this place and the ships were
separated from each other.
The Juno weathered the storm and changing winds for a few
days and she headed north in search of changing weather. The sea
was making the ship work very hard and to her disadvantage for
now she was beginning to leak.
On the night of the 22nd, there were big waves and a stiff wind
from the northeast so that the ship rode out her topsail on all
reef-points. The result of this was that the sail split and the
ship remained unable to continue sailing for half an hour until
the mizzen mast was cut. The wind was so furious that it wrenched
both the main mast and the fore top sail, throwing the mainmast
against the handrail and thereby open a (water) course into the
ship.
All the men worked quickly at clearing the deck and checking all
the cables. The caulker on duty came up from the hold to announce
there was 74 inches of water there and it looked as though it
would increase. Thereafter followed moments of great fatigue for,
observing that two pumps were not sufficient, all four pumps were
put into action and the sailors and soldiers were distributed
around the ship in such a way as to work and take turns at rest
for a while.
On the 25th of October the weather cleared and the Captain took
advantage of this situation to investigate the origin of the leak
and impede the rate of its alarming increase. The scrupulous
investigation of the lower part of the ship showed that the
problem was in the boatswain's storeroom/quarters. Once
discovering this the hardships of the previous night were
immediately forgotten and the Captain's orders were followed
efficiently and quickly. From the mainmast to the bow, all
artillery and third and fourth anchors were thrown overboard. The
storerooms were cleared and supplies moved back to the stern. All
methods were tried to stop the leak in the boatswain's area and
none proved to be successful: neither oakum nor plaster, sealing
off the area from the inside or applying sails from the outside.
It was to no avail and in fact the amount of water was increasing
to serious proportions.
On the 24th, a ship was seen and the Juno gave chase. It
was an American schooner which, with good intentions, approached
to observe the frigate's signals. The Captain of the schooner
agreed to the Captain's proposals and decided to sail with the Juno
and follow her orders.
Once the conditions were formalized, the second in command of the
Juno, D. Francisco Clemente boarded the schooner Favorita.
As well, the Lieutenant of the African regiment, D. Jose Maria
Zorilla, the cadet D. Antonio Malagon and four grenadiers also
boarded the schooner with provision that might be needed in an
emergency. A plan of signals was decided upon for day and night
to indicate if the water in the ship was rising or diminishing.
Also, if the leaks became such, that it was necessary to unload
the men, the method by which the schooner would approach the Juno
in all haste. Having taken these sensible precautions, the
Captain truly believed he could save his ship and make it to a
port in the United States which was the closest coast. He
encouraged his men and sailed on a course with a fresh
southwesterly wind, working the pumps without ceasing.
On the 27th the schooner was informed that the Juno had
lost her rudder during the night with the raising water in the
ship and the pumps were no longer able to sustain the leaks. The
men bailed water by hand now in the bow and the stern, and a
steering oar was set up to replace the rudder. So they continued
and at midday the ship was at 38 degrees latitude north, 69.56
degrees longitude west which was recognized as being quite close
to the coast.
This she did, until ten o'clock that evening. At that time, the
wind changed to the northwest and there was such a violent squall
that the gaff peak was parted, leaving the ship under bare poles,
and defenseless though she managed to avoid the sea's blows for a
distance of 10 to 11 miles. The frigate lost her mainmast, the
fore topsail mast and the yard which had been used to replace the
tiller. The ship sent signals to the schooner for help as she was
no longer able to hold out but the schooner was only able to come
to leeward as close as a third of a cable's distance. This was
close enough to hear the anguished cries for help and watch the
ship disappearing below. Overcome by the wind and convinced that
she would capsize if she attempted to come around, the schooner
remained incapable of maneuvering for the rest of the night.
At dawn on the 28th….the crew of the Favorita waited
to sight the frigate but discovered that she had vanished forever
in the course of that horrible night. Convinced of this
misfortune, which was later confirmed, the Favorita
continued her route inland and dropped anchor in the port of
Boston on November 1.
According to the testimony of the ship's lieutenant Clemente and
the other six men from the Juno who were saved on the
schooner, order, composure, and obeying command onboard the Juno
prevailed at all times. The troops under the command of their
officials worked the pumps until they were no longer able to, the
sailor's efforts to cut off the leaks, replace the tiller and
attending to other repairs were without limits and the Captain
was worthy of the confidence placed in him. Everyone carried out
their duty."
QUICKSILVER INTERNATIONAL
The wreck of the Juno
became a business interest for Quicksilver in 1987, after the
Wancheese Seafood Company trawler Lady Cheryl, dragging
its nets approximately 40 miles off of the Eastern Shore of
Virginia, pulled in a large bronze bell with its catch of marine
life. Subsequent hauls recovered a section of the sternpost of a
sailing vessel, including two bronze grudgeons. Quicksilver soon
made a deal with the Captain, and began searching for the source
of the artifacts, hoping to find the Juno.
After several years of fruitless surveys with side-scan sonar and
other remote sensing equipment, contracted teams had only been
able to locate a sailboat and a cabin cruiser; their target
continued to elude them. A wreck was supposedly discovered in
1989 that held promise: according to Gary Gentile in Shipwrecks
of Virginia, a site was surveyed that consisted of
"cannon balls, a metal spike, and wooden planks within the
perimeter of the wreck, whose outline was clearly delineated by a
ridge of sand on either side of the main wreckage."
Forward to 1997 – Quicksilver soon began making new claims
to finally discovering the wreck of the Juno. Whether this
new wreck site is the same one as the 1989 site, or if the 1989
site even existed, is unclear. Regardless, the salvage group had
recovered video footage utilizing their two man submersible,
documenting the site as it lay in 180' of water. While
intriguing, it hardly was conclusive. Quicksilver quickly
reserved the services of a group of experienced divers to survey
the site and attempt to recover any artifacts that may facilitate
the sites identity. The salvage vessel, with its submersible,
departed Ocean City to rendevous with a dive vessel leaving from
Virginia Beach. Unfortunately, the group of divers were forced to
return due to rough seas. Shortly thereafter, due to conflicts,
the relationship between the two groups was terminated.
Quicksilver soon turned to another group of experienced divers to
work the site, and initial work was completed in December.
Divers, submersibles, and remotely operated vehicles surveyed the
site and recovered various artifacts. Yet, the identity continued
to avoid them.
On a trip to the site in April of 1998, tragedy struck. Tai
Wilkerson, an accomplished diver, experienced complications and
became unconscious. Attempting to get Tai to the surface, his
dive partner inflated his drysuit, rocketing him upwards from
180'. Though surface personnel worked furiously to revive him,
his traumatic and rapid ascent thwarted their attempts; the
coroner's report indicated massive embolisms in the spine and
brain.
The exact content of video documentation and conversations with
various involved divers can not be disclosed, however,
discussions with a maritime archaeologist familiar with the wreck
site – though not involved with its salvage – rebutted
the theory noting several glaring discrepancies. Furthermore, one
may wonder why positive identification has not been forthcoming.
If this is indeed the 1989 site, it is suspicious why, after
almost a decade, they have failed to determine whether it is, or
isn't, the wreck of the Juno, while still soliciting for
potential investors.
SEA HUNT, INCORPORATED
Ben Benson,
President of Sea Hunt, began actively searching for the Juno
in 1996, after associates combed through the library and Accomack
County courthouse for records of lost vessels in the area.
Accounts of two, the Galga and the Juno, were of
special interest. Returning to the Eastern Shore of Virginia
where he made a financial windfall developing Cedar Island,
Benson set up shop on Chincoteague Island in order to pursue the
location of the shipwrecks. During his investigation, Captain Bob
Payne, of Payne's Sea Treasures, came to his attention. In front
of his curio shop, Capt. Bob had displayed a large anchor that a
local fisherman had recovered in his nets close to shore.
Eventually, a pewter plate that was concreted to the anchor and
removed prior to the anchor's display, was returned. On its
weathered surface, what appears to be an elegant letter
"J", adorned its surface. This, along with other
artifacts and research, helped to stimulate the theory that the
wreck lay close to shore.
Attorneys for Sea Hunt, Inc. obtained the necessary exploration
permits from the Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC),
though they prevented him from encroaching within a half mile of
the beach during the summer months, to prevent conflicts with
visiting tourists and bathers. During the "off-season,"
Benson could operate closer to the beach, although he would
become subject to the same harsh weather that sunk the Juno.
As a condition of the permit, Benson agreed to share 25% of the
recovered assets from the wreck site to the Commonwealth of
Virginia.
Utilizing hang logs from a local commercial fisherman, Benson
began to locate several wrecks within his permitted search sites,
including the Presidential yacht Despatch. One area
produced a scatter trail that looked like it could have been the
remains of the lost Spanish frigate; magnetometer anomalies were
dispersed around a wide area. Diving surveys in the murky water
recovered multiple conglomerates of iron and other indeterminate
material. After analyzing the "congloms" by x-ray and
later dissecting the masses, several artifacts were recovered
including 18th Century Spanish coins, beads, and munitions
consistent with a ship like the Juno. Many other
artifacts, including portions of a wooden vessel, were also
recovered. While not a positive identification, the evidence was
compelling. Several other large congloms were scheduled to be
recovered, but a political storm was brewing on the horizon...
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND SPANISH GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
The National Park Service (NPS), with a long track record of animosity to sport divers and salvagers, was not happy with the operations of Sea Hunt. Communications from the Assateague National Park Superintendent to VMRC sought to seek the revocation of Sea Hunt's permits to "salvage the wreck site." VMRC replied that they had not issued a salvage permit, per se, but rather an exploration permit to survey a particular area. Since the wreck of the Juno had not been positively identified as yet, the Agency could not issue a salvage permit to a specific wreck. This did not please the NPS. In an attempt to circumnavigate the issued permit, the NPS stated that while the Juno is interned in "state bottom," in order to access the site one must traverse the water column above the wreck, which they maintained was federal jurisdiction – obviously a weak position. When that approach proved futile, the NPS, in conjunction with the Department of Justice (DOJ), sought to enlist the support of the Spanish government.
KEEP IN MIND, UP UNTIL THIS POINT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAD NEVER PURSUED CLAIMS ON SUNKEN NAVAL VESSELS (INCLUDING THE WELL-KNOWN TREASURE SHIP ATOCHA), STATING THAT THEY HAD NEITHER THE TIME, NOR THE RESOURCES, TO ADEQUATELY WORK THE SITES.
Apparently, the Spanish Government continued to be disinterested in the Juno, as they indicated their status quo position to the DOJ and the NPS on two separate occasions. However, the Spanish Government drastically changed their position after a third request from the DOJ and NPS. There was speculation that the Spanish Government were strong-armed into submission by the two Agencies, but documentation has not been produced to date. While it is unclear what exactly transpired, the Spanish Government completely reversed their position; a Spanish Naval Attache sent a letter to the VMRC, requesting that all operations cease on the "grave site" of the Juno, stating that the remains of the vessel were the "sovereign territory" of Spain. Again, the VMRC supported the issued exploration permit. Dialogue was also established with the Governor's office, who supported the actions of the VMRC, but continued to state that the Commonwealth's course of action would be re-evaluated if, and when, the wreck of the Juno is positively identified.
CONCLUSIONS
To this date, the
wreck of the Juno has not been positively identified. Both
groups maintain that they have discovered the Juno, though
they lack artifacts to conclusively establish their find.
Conversations with both groups, as well as review of available
information and examination of recovered artifacts, indicate that
Sea Hunt may be on the verge of validating their hypothesis that
the wreck of the Juno does in fact, lie close to shore off
Assateague Island.
Sea Hunt has recovered numerous artifacts that are consistent
with a Spanish wreck of that time period, as well as finding many
other anomalies in the wreck site that have yet to be recovered
and analyzed. Furthermore, Sea Hunt has gained invaluable
information from local residents who have retrieved other
artifacts, such as Spanish coins and deadeyes, from the beach
adjacent to the survey site. However, until a change in the
attitude and position of the DOJ and NPS occurs, further
investigation at the Sea Hunt site may never transpire.
Quicksilver International, while making claims of finding cannon
and other fascinating artifacts at their site, has yet to recover
any such items or provide other like documentation. One might
wonder why they have been unable or unwilling to substantiate
these claims, while still offering the dream of untold riches
(including a call-in to a local radio station to perpetuate their
claims and solicit investors) to potential financiers – it
would appear that the only treasure that Quicksilver will recover
from this site are the funds earned from naive dreamers.
Furthermore, while the group recovered a large bronze bell and a
sternpost that may have come from the Juno, this too can
be discounted. The two objects, should they have come from the
vessel, were obviously lost during the storm – it was
documented that her rudder gave way, and the 2,500 pound bronze
bell could have been thrown overboard to lighten the burden of
the ship when the crew learned of their peril. As these objects
were recovered in a trawler net, the exact distance between the
two is unknown; nets are dragged for extended periods of time
well behind the trawler, eliminating information on the point of
origin. Therefore, these artifacts may have remained on the
bottom many miles away from the actual wreck site.
It is interesting to observe the tenacity that the NPS and the
DOJ pursued Sea Hunt, in an attempt to prevent the group from
working the wreck site. Additionally, it is curious to note that
this pursuit did not encompass the work of Quicksilver
International.
Tremendous amounts of effort and large sums of money have been
invested in the search for the Juno. Like most other
"treasure hunts," speculation and optimistic (inflated)
estimates on the exact cargo fuel the venture. While it was known
that the Juno was carrying treasure on her initial
journey, it was documented that it was unloaded when the vessel
was forced to head to Cuba to seek repairs for damage incurred
from an early storm. The exact cargo the Juno was carrying
when she left Cuba is unknown. Undoubtedly, she was carrying the
personal effects and treasures of her 425 passengers. These
artifacts may, in the end, be the richest treasure, providing a
glimpse into 18th Century Spanish life.